We compare laboratory general equilibrium economies in which maintenance of a depreciating Economy is too complex for subjects to solve for optimally, but simple institutional constraints yield aggregate efficiency.
Introduction
Given the prevalence and importance of public goods in society, ways of financing their production have attracted much interest.
1 Game theoretic models suggest that egoistic individuals have little reason to finance production of public goods through individual voluntary anonymous contributions. Laboratory public good experiments tend initially to yield average contributions around 50 percent of the collective optimum, gradually declining towards a 5-20 percent range. Although the averages rarely drop below 5 percent, many individuals make zero contributions. In addition to these basic results, theoretical and experimental work has explored incentive schemes for individuals to voluntarily contribute more to the provision of public goods.
Given the fundamentally dispersed nature of information and the difficulty of gathering such information in the hands of a central planner (Hayek 1945) , devising decentralized schemes for provision of public goods through anonymous voluntary contributions has strong theoretical and intellectual appeal. However, these efforts have been only partially successful.
There is little reason for society to confine its search for efficient solutions for this pervasive problem to only anonymous voluntary contributions. Institutions may evolve to address various problems of economizing through socio-political and economic processes of adjustment, experimentation, and feedback over rules, expectations, and conventions. It is reasonable to conjecture that the scope of such social evolution includes the provision of public goods. 2 In modern democratic societies taxes, set by an elected government, are the most 1 For a survey of the substantial pre-1995 literature on experimental gaming with public goods see Ledyard (1995) . From considerable literature since then, we mention only a few. Fehr and Gächter (2000) consider public goods experiments without punishment for free riding; Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) investigate how individuals' cooperative disposition and experience interact; Brandts and Schram (2001) consider voluntary contribution mechanisms for public goods; Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) consider public goods provision where the individuals have different marginal values for their private goods; Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2001) deal with public goods, tax policies and unemployment in less developed countries. Modeling in the last of these papers noted is closer to the spirit of our own emphasis on the importance of institutional structure in the economy.
2 Financing the creation of a new public good facility requires considerably more capital than paying to operate and maintain an existing facility. The two may also differ in their political feasibility, especially under uncertainty. In the present model and experiment, we confine ourselves to consideration of financing the operation and maintenance of common way to finance public goods. We therefore explore how efficient the provision of public goods is in a system with taxes set by subjects through a vote. In an additional treatment subjects can also vote on whether they want to implement a system with taxes or with anonymous voluntary contributions. Walker et al. (2000) seem to have been the first to consider the efficiency implications of a combined common-property-with-voting allocation scheme in the laboratory. Their evidence suggests people cooperate more with perfectly enforced voting rules relative to a no-vote scheme. However, their common-property setting is quite distinct from the public good we explore here. Kroll et al. (2007) employ a more common public-goods setting and voting and report that voting by itself does not increase cooperation; if voters can punish defectors, contributions increase significantly. With perfect enforcement they find 100 percent contribution rates in most periods. While these results are useful, a tax of 100 percent is neither realistic nor desirable in practice. We thus explore an economy with private and public goods where voting is used to determine the tax rate -the optimum of which is at an intermediate level, as is the optimal consumption rate. We use a process-oriented strategic market game in which the maintenance of existing public goods is financed through a tax on private income. The unique equilibrium solution for any tax rate yields an optimal consumption/investment policy for each individual. General dynamic programming analysis of our basic model enables us to solve for an optimal rate of taxation for society as a whole. 3 We set up and examine a model economy in the laboratory under two sets of conditions:
(1) when the tax rate is exogenously fixed at the theoretical optimum (which only an omniscient government could implement); and (2) when the rate of taxation can be adjusted through a democratic process. As a comparison and bridge to existing literature we also examine the performance of otherwise identical economies in which taxation is replaced by individual anonymous voluntary contributions. In a supplementary treatment, to partly capture the political process, we let subjects decide by majority vote on which system they want to see implemented in their society -anonymous voluntary contributions or taxes.
an existing public good facility in absence of uncertainty; smooth incremental additions to stock are assumed to be feasible.
3 Appendix A presents an EXCEL workbook (available online at the URLs given in the Appendix) which allows readers to manipulate any of the input variables of the model and charts the respective changes in utility and other variables.
Our 2x2 experiment has four main treatments and two supplemental treatments (see Table 1 ). Of the four, Treatment 1 has a given tax rate and the starting stock of the public good is at GE level contrasted with starting with 50 percent of optimal in Treatment 2. The taxation is set exogenously at the theoretical optimal level to maintain the optimal stock of the public good facility in both cases. Information on the optimal maintenance level is not given to agents. 4 In Treatments 3 and 4, the tax rate is set endogenously through subjects' choice (at the median choice) once every five periods, starting with optimal and suboptimal public facility levels in Treatments 3 and 4, respectively.
In order to compare and contrast our results with the voluminous literature on voluntary anonymous contributions, we supplement our 2x2 experimental design with treatment T0 which starts with the optimal level of public good (as in Treatments 1 and 3), but taxation is replaced by anonymous voluntary contributions towards the production of the public good.
In the second supplemental treatment, T5, we aim to capture part of the dynamics of the political process by having subjects choose by majority vote whether they want to live in a society with anonymous voluntary contributions or with taxes (followed by implementation of the chosen regime).
We find that the four main treatments with finite horizon experimental economies sustain public goods at about 80-90 percent of the infinite horizon optimum level, and 90 to 100 percent efficiency, especially when the rate of taxation is determined by voting. Starting with the optimum level, the stock of the public good declines to around 80 percent of optimum; but starting from 50 percent of the optimum, the stock of the public good rises to about the same level. This holds also in the supplemental treatment T5 in which 23 times out of 24 subjects chose taxation over a voluntary contribution regime by majority vote. In all treatments except the one with anonymous voluntary contributions the ending stock of public goods exceeded the finite horizon optimum. These results from a general equilibrium laboratory economy suggest that taxation is suitable as a social institution to address the problem of under-production of public goods through voluntary contributions. The model is presented in Section 2, followed by the experimental design, results, and a discussion in the subsequent sections of the paper.
A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of an Economy with a Public Good
We consider a version of Samuelson's pure public good (Samuelson, 1954) embedded in a parallel dynamic programming control process that has been solved for its type-symmetric noncooperative (rational expectations) equilibrium for any tax rate (see Karatzas et al. 2011) . 5 The dynamic structure of the game also includes a government and voting.
The basic model involves the maintenance of a depreciating public good facility such as a transportation or sewage system (see Appendix C for a description with minimal notation). 6 The game has a government and n individual agents each initially endowed with a quantity of private good and money (a, m). The government is endowed with G units of the public good and M units of money at the outset. It also has the right to collect as tax a fraction θ of individuals' income from the sale of private goods, and a production function that transforms its tax revenues into the public good.
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A move by an agent i in any period t is to decide how much money to bid (b ti ) to buy private goods in the market 8 and, after she receives the private good from the market, how much to consume and how much to put into production for the following period. Our theory approximates equilibrium as though the number of agents is large enough that they have no influence on the price. We have n =10 in the experiment, ignoring the presence of a small oligopolistic influence.
A period begins with government in possession of taxes gathered in the preceding period in the form of money (M in period 1), and public good G from the preceding period depreciated by 10 percent. The n agents carry their after-tax money balances from the previous period (m in period 1), and the units of the private good they produced at the end of the previous period (a in period 1). We use a sell-all market mechanism, in which individuals' entire balance of private goods is automatically offered for sale in a market (see Huber et al. 2010 for properties of the 5 Formally, with a continuum of agents we solved for any tax level; then after solving this set with taxation level as a parameter we solved for the optimum from the point of view of a benevolent central government. 6 It also could be a wage-supported bureaucracy that provides a self-policing system for the economy. Although its cost could be one of the most important and earliest of costs of public goods, it is rarely mentioned in discussions of public goods. 7 Even at this level of simplicity, given that production takes time, there are accounting questions to be considered in the definition of periodic income and profits. In a stationary equilibrium the timing differences disappear. 8 In the experiment all money was automatically bid, so b it =m it .
sell-all mechanism). In the experiment each individual automatically bids his total money balance b to buy the private good from the market. The government also bids all its money balance � for the private good. A price p is computed as the ratio of the total money bid (by agents and the government) divided by the total number of units of private goods available.
The government as well as each agent gets the money they bid divided by the price of the private good (k i = b i /p units for individual; = � ⁄ units for the government). Each agent, being a producer as well as a consumer, divides the units bought between consumption and production.
In addition, each agent receives the price multiplied by the number of units sold as his income in units of money. This money income is then taxed at a uniform tax rate, either pre-set to the optimum of θ = 21.5% (in Treatments 1 and 2) or set endogenously through a vote of subjects (in Treatments 3 and 4).
The n producer/consumer agents have a concave private good production function
25 with a one period production time lag, and a payoff function of the form u(x, G) = (x + G/4), with x being the consumption of private goods and G being the stock of public goods.
The government uses the k units of private good it buys to produce F(k) = 2*k 0.5 units of the public good which is added to the stock of the public good at the beginning of the next period. Depreciation is a fixed percentage of the level of capital stock -in the experiment we use 10 percent depreciation rate. The government carries the tax collected as money balance to the following period to buy private goods. In equilibrium the production of public goods precisely covers depreciation, otherwise the amount of the stock of the public good changes. This describes one full period of the game.
In implementing an experimental game with a finite termination we are faced with the question of how to value the stock of public good and money holdings at the end of the game.
With zero valuation, we expect that the maintenance of the public good facility will tend to drop off towards the end of experimental sessions. We set up an Excel workbook to numerically solve the dynamic program when the value of the stock of public good is zero at the end of the session. 9 The results obtained from this optimization are labeled "finite horizon" to distinguish them from the "infinite horizon" results throughout the paper. The terminal or "salvage value" of left over money, goods and the public good are all zero. Subjects are instructed that the session will end with 1/6 th chance after period 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, or 30. Instructions given and explained to the subjects are included in the appendix. Through this explanation and trials, the subjects gained a reasonable understanding of the decisions they had to make, the opportunity sets from which various decisions had to be chosen, and how their own and others' decisions were linked to their payoffs. It is unlikely, and almost impossible, for any subjects to have understood the mathematical structure and properties of the model economy in this experiment (or for that matter, in most experiments where the mathematical structure is nontrivial). It is not the purpose of the experiment to assess the cognitive capacities of subjects to intuitively arrive at optimal solutions to stochastic dynamic programs; that would be outside the scope of this paper, and fall into cognitive psychology or psychological economics. Our aim is only to find out if the mathematical solutions provide a reasonable neighborhood of attraction for aggregate outcomes of the economies populated with agents having abilities of ordinary people.
We consider a multiperiod dynamic model of a durable public good as representative of many situations in a modern mass economy. In doing so, several subtle difficulties appear. In particular before optimality can be well defined, the cost of the path to an equilibrium as well as the efficient yield at equilibrium must be taken into account. If the future has little value and the maintenance of a public good is costly one might as well forego maintenance in favor of immediate consumption. In our experiment this was avoided by selecting no discount on the future.
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A further experimental difficulty occurs as the experiment time horizon is finite. We expect and empirically find some drop off near the end of the play as the remaining public goods are of no further value.
Experimental Design
The experiment consists of variations on the regime to finance public infrastructure and the initial stock of infrastructure the economy is endowed with in a 4x2 design (see Table 1 ). The four variations in the regime are:
• Control treatment T0 in which the subjects make anonymous voluntary contributions (AVC) for production of the public good. This treatment serves as a benchmark for comparison with the results from experimental literature on AVC partial equilibrium economies.
• Exogenously fixed tax rate (at optimal level of 21.5%) in regimes T1 and T2. In T1 (and T3), the starting level of the stock of public good is at its steady state (i.e., infinite horizon) optimum. However, it cannot be taken for granted that government can identify and build the optimal public facilties at the optimal level in the first place. In order to assess the dynamic ability of the system to adjust when the starting point is at optimal, we use Treatment T2 (and T4) in which the starting level is 50% of the steady state optimum.
• Whether governments have the ability or incentives to set the rate of taxation at the optimal level is, at the very least, controversial. We therefore contrast the results of optimal exogenous tax rate economies (T1 and T2) against economies with endogenously determined tax rate (median of individual proposals) in regimes T3 and T4; and
• Institutional evolution through voting between AVC and taxation regimes in T5.
The second and the third variations in this list of four are combined with two variations in the initial stock of public facility:
• Initial stock of public facility at 100% of the optimal level in T1 and T3; and
• Initial stock of public facility at 50% of the optimal level in T2 and T4.
We conducted two to six independent sessions with different subjects with each of the following six combinations of variations in financing regime and initial endowment of the public facility:
• T0: AVC with 100% of optimal initial endowment (2 sessions).
• T1: Exogenously fixed tax rate (at optimal level of θ = 21.5%) with 100% of optimal initial endowment (4 sessions).
• T2: Exogenously fixed tax rate (at optimal level of θ = 21.5%) with 50% of optimal initial endowment (4 sessions).
• T3: Endogenously determined tax rate (median of individual proposals) with 100% of optimal initial endowment (6 sessions).
• T4: Endogenously determined tax rate (median of individual proposals) with 50% of optimal initial endowment (6 sessions).
• T5: Institutional evolution through voting between AVC and tax regime, and on the tax rate (4 sessions described in more detail below).
In the two T0 sessions, voluntary anonymous contributions financed the public infrastructure, starting from the initial endowment set at the optimal level G = 427. Individuals specified their contributions in units of money in one session, and in percent of their income in the other.
In T3, the economy starts with the optimal level of public good (G = 427). While this number is known, subjects do not know that it is the optimum. The exogenously imposed tax rate of T1 is replaced with a rate determined by a vote of the participants every five periods. Each subject submits a tax proposal and the median of the ten proposals is chosen as the rate of taxation applied to all subjects for five periods, until the next vote is taken. The agents therefore have the collective freedom to increase or reduce the provision for public goods through voting. In T4, the voting mechanism is retained from T3, but the initial level of public good is changed from 100 to 50 percent of the optimal level (G = 213.5).
In T5 subjects first experience five periods with AVC (setup of T0) and then five periods with taxes (setup of T3). Then the treatment starts where subjects collectively decide by majority vote whether they want to implement AVC or taxes for the next five periods (one institution is randomly picked in case of a 5:5 tie in the vote, which happened once). The selected mechanism is implemented for five periods when the next vote is taken. Holdings of goods (public and private) and cash are carried over from period to period in all treatments. Table 2 shows the values of the parameters of the experiment: number of agents in each session (n) is 10; initial money endowment of each agent is 6,000 in T0, 4,700 in all other treatments; initial private good endowment of each agent is 217; their private good production function is 80*k 0.25 and their single period payoff is the sum of their private consumption and 25% of the level of public good in that period. The initial endowments of the government are 13,000 in money (0 in T0) and the initial stock of the public good G is 427 (in T0, T1, T3, and T5) or 213.5
(in T2 and T4). The public good depreciates at 10 percent each period, and the public good production function is 2*k 0.5 . The natural rate of discount is 1. units of the private good to produce 2*467.7 0.5 = 43.25 units of the public good which is just enough to offset the depreciation (10% of 427 units) of the equilibrium stock of the public good.
We conducted a total of 26 independent runs, each with a different cohort of 10 subjects for a total of 260 subjects. All subjects were BA or MA students in Management or Economics at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. All sessions were carried out using a program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Average duration of a session was approximately 60 minutes and average earnings were 15 Euros.
Results from the Experiment
Results economies are known to the subjects to last for a finite number of periods (25), strictly speaking, the thick green dashed line for finite horizon equilibrium is the appropriate benchmark for comparing the empirical data. However, we add the thick black dashed line for infinite horizon equilibrium as an additional benchmark if subjects ignore the impending end of the economy until close to the end. 
Stock of Public Good (Figure 1)
The top left panel in Figure 1 shows the time series of the stock of public good observed during the four independent sessions of Treatment 1 (with fixed tax rate of 21.5%, starting with the optimal stock 427 of the public good at the beginning of Period 1). Time paths of the stock of public good for each of the four sessions are shown in thin solid grey lines and the mean of the four paths is shown in a thick solid black line. Given the small dispersion of the four paths around the mean, the latter captures their central tendency well. Two thick broken lines chart the general equilibrium benchmarks -the black horizontal line at 427 for the steady state or infinite horizon level of public good, and the curved green line for the finite horizon level with expected ending stock of public good at 310. 11, 12 The same conventions are used to depict data in the other panels of Figure 1 and in other figures.
In all four of these sessions (top left panel), the stock of public good gradually but steadily declined over the 25 rounds from the starting level (G = 427) to the range of 355-402
and to an average of 381, which is 46 below the steady state level, but 71 above the finite horizon optimum of 310.
The top right panel in Figure 1 shows the four runs of Treatment 2 with tax rate fixed at the optimal level (21.5%) but starting with 50 percent of the optimal stock of public good (213.5). In all sessions of Treatment 2, the stock of public good rose steadily from 213.5 to a narrow 357-366 range (average 362) with little variation across the four sessions). As shown by the thick broken curved line, the finite horizon optimum stock of public good rises from 213.5 at the beginning of period 1 to a high of 378 in period 14, and then declines gradually to 295 at the end of the session. The average stock of public good at the end of these four sessions is 65 short of the steady state level but 67 above the finite horizon optimum of 295. So far we can conclude that with the tax rate exogenously fixed at the optimum level, the stock of the public good converges near the midpoint between the finite-and infinite-horizon levels. This happens irrespective of the starting stock of the public good.
11 Since the end of the session was announced to be uncertain (1/6 th chance of ending after period 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30), the finite horizon equilibrium predictions are given in expected values (see Appendix A). 12 In an unconstrained environment, one would expect the finite horizon equilibrium stock of public good to be exhausted to zero at the end of the session. Since the stock of public good depreciates at a constant rate of 10% per period, exhaustion close to zero at the end would require lower investment in early periods. The lower payoff in those periods prevents the optimal level of public good from being driven to exhaustion at the end in a finite horizon economy.
In the bottom left panel of Figure 1 , the six sessions of Treatment 3, with endogenously determined tax rates and starting with optimal stock of public good, the stock of public good tended to decline over the rounds to the range of 352-404 and to an average of 371. This average is 56 below the steady state optimum but 76 above the finite horizon optimum. In the bottom right panel, the six sessions of Treatment 4, with endogenously determined tax rates but starting from half the optimal level of public good (213.5) are presented. The stock of public good tended to rise to the range of 273-406 with an average of 344 (91 below the steady state optimum and 49 above the finite horizon optimum).
A comparison of the data in the four panels of Figure 1 suggests some differences but also strong similarities. The stock of public good shows greater dispersion across multiple independent sessions of identical economies when tax rates are endogenous, instead of being fixed. Starting from the optimal level, the stock of public good tends to decline to the neighborhood of 370 irrespective of whether the tax rate is fixed or determined by the vote of participants. Starting from the suboptimal level, the stock of public good tends to rise gradually to the neighborhood of 360 irrespective the tax rate being fixed or determined by the vote of participants. In 19 of the 20 economies, the stock of public good at the end of the sessions lies inside the range defined by infinite and finite horizon optima. The null hypothesis that the terminal stock of public good is identical across the four treatments cannot be rejected (pairwise Mann-Whitney U-test, all p-values 0.2 or higher).
It seems reasonable to infer, on the basis of these 20 independent sessions of experimental economies, that the stock of public good tends towards the range of 350-375, and this range seems to form a domain of attraction for these economies. This domain is below the optimum (427), but above the finite horizon optima of 295-310.
Finally, the two left panels of Figure 1 show, in thin chain-dotted lines, the time paths of the stock of public good in two Treatment 0 economies in which taxation was replaced by individual voluntary anonymous contributions. In these two sessions, the stock of public goods declined steadily and sharply to 147 and 170 respectively, at the end of period 15. This is much lower than levels observed in any period of any of the 20 economies with taxation. These results are consistent with those obtained in voluminous experimental literature on partial equilibrium economies in which public goods are financed by anonymous voluntary contributions.
Tax Rates (Figure 2)
The two top row panels in this figure are empty because the tax rate was exogenously fixed at 21.5 percent in Treatments 1 and 2. In the left bottom panel for Treatment 3 (with the initial stock of public good at steady state level 427) the endogenously determined tax rate remained generally below 21.5 percent and seem to decline slightly from range 17.5-22 (average 19.8) in the first vote to 5-22.5 percent (average 14.3) in the sixth and final vote. Note that the finite horizon optimal tax rate (broken thick curved line) declines from 25% to near zero because the terminal conditions assign zero value to the stock of public good at the end of the session.
The endogenously determined tax rates do not decline as rapidly.
Similarly, in the right bottom panel for Treatment 4 (suboptimal initial stock of public good), the endogenously determined tax rates remains mostly below the optimal level of 21.5 percent and decline slightly from range 11-23 (average 18.3 percent) in the first vote to 8-23 (average 16.3 percent) in the sixth and final vote. Compared to the finite horizon benchmark, subjects chose higher tax rates to support a rise in the stock of public goods from a suboptimal level over time (as observed in the right bottom panel of Figure 1 ). In all 12 endogenous tax economies, agents vote to pay taxes higher than the finite horizon optimum in the second half of the sessions -thus an enforced tax that is equal for all does not lead to a break-down as is 
Efficiency (Figure 3)
The total points earned by all subjects as a percentage of the number of points they would have earned if the economies had achieved the infinite horizon (steady state) general equilibrium outcomes is defined as the efficiency of these economies. Results for the 20 sessions are presented in the four panels of Figure 3 which parallel the layout of panels in Figure 1 . Note that finite horizon efficiencies (shown in thick broken curved line) can exceed 100% in some periods because agents can earn a higher but unsustainable payoff by consuming more thereby depleting the stock of the public good towards the end of the session.
In Treatment 1 with fixed tax rate and stock of the public good starting at the optimum It is reasonable to infer that 80-90 percent is the domain of attraction for the efficiency of these economies. Surprisingly, given the prior results from public good economies with individual anonymous voluntary contributions, efficiency is slightly higher with endogenous choice of tax rate. Efficiency in the last period of T3 is higher, although hardly significant, than in T1 or T2 (Mann-Whitney U-tests, p-value=0.09 for both tests), while there are no other significant differences between treatments.
The chain-dotted lines in the two left panels for Treatment 0 economies are hardly distinguishable from the lines for efficiency of T1 and T3 economies. While suboptimal consumption decisions tended to lower the efficiency of T0 economies, letting the stock of public good run down raised it at the expense of unobserved decline in efficiency of periods beyond 25 (the end of the sessions). These two effects on efficiency tended to cancel each other out, leaving the efficiency paths of T0 to be essentially indistinguishable from T1 and T3.
Overall, the null hypothesis that the efficiency of the economies under the five treatments is the same cannot be rejected (with the above mentioned exception that T3 is marginally more efficient than T1 and T2).
While the stock of public good, endogenously-determined rate of taxation, and efficiency of these economies are overall measures of their performance, we can also assess the decisions made by subjects that led to these aggregate outcomes. In the following paragraphs we present analyses of these decisions.
Total Production (Figure 4)
The thick broken lines for GE production in infinite and finite economies overlap at 2170 except in the final period when the finite period production drops.
The four panels of Figure 4 show the time paths of total production of the private good in the 22 economies for the five treatments T0 to T4. In all economies, the level of production was near the optimum at the outset (2170) (54) is much smaller than the loss of output from comparable negative deviations. Thus, while the average input is closer to the optimum (44.8 units overall and 53.2 in the first 10 periods), average output is lower due to dispersion of inputs across individual subjects. Also, optimal production would fall sharply in periods 26 to 30 in the finite-horizon benchmark. Thus, the decline observed in the experiments is also theoretically justifiable.
The chain-dotted lines for T0 economies in the two left panels of Figure 4 are not distinguishable from the time paths of T1 and T3 economies.
Total Consumption as a Fraction of Purchase of Private Goods by Individuals (Figure 5)
The four panels of Figure 5 show the time paths of total consumption of private good as a fraction of the private good purchased by the individuals (recall that the private goods purchased but not consumed are allocated to produce the private good in the following period). The reason for the steady decline in production of private goods (in Figure 4) While the GE prediction is 68.3 percent, actual average of consumption of individuals ranged from 71 to 89 percent, with many economies exhibiting an upward spike in this consumption during the later rounds of the sessions. As suggested by the finite horizon equilibrium, subjects may consume more instead of investing in the public good towards the end of the session. Recall that subjects did not receive any value from the stock of public good at the end of the session and that they faced uncertainty about the length of the experiment. The observed behavior can thus be considered quite "rational".
The two chain-dotted lines for T0 economies in the two left panels suggest slightly higher rates of consumption in voluntary contribution economies of T0 as compared to T1 and T3. Gürerk et al. (2006) were the first to introduce "voting by feet" dynamics in a traditional public goods setting. In their paper two institutions were simultaneously run. Both institutions have anonymous voluntary contributions, but punishment (sanctioning) is possible in only one.
Supplementary Treatment where subjects vote on which system to implement
They find that contributions in the sanctioning institution converge towards 100%, but approximate 0% in the sanction-free environment. While initially some 70% of subjects chose to be in the sanction-free institutions, this changes over time and in the last few periods more than 90% of subjects chose the sanctioning institution, where high contributions and thus high earnings prevail. Sanctioning itself is rarely needed, as contributions are high.
Real societies can, through vote or revolution, choose their institutions. We capture part of this process in supplementary treatment T5 where subjects decide every five periods by majority vote whether to finance the public good through voluntary anonymous contributions or through taxes. Subjects first experience 5 periods with each of the two institutions; that is they first have five rounds each with T0 and T3, each. Then initial endowments are reestablished and a vote is taken on which system to implement. Every five periods there is a new vote on the system. We conducted four runs of this treatment for a total of 24 votes on the institution.
The main result is that in 23 out of 24 decisions subjects chose taxes over voluntary anonymous contributions. Most of voting decisions were not close, with 7.6 of 10 votes for taxation on average, with a slight upward trend over time (7.3 in the first vote; 8.0 in the last).
Only one decision (in run 3) favored voluntary anonymous contributions by 6-4 vote. One other vote in run 3 was 5-5 tie randomly resolved by computer in favor of taxes. We infer that with some experience and given the choice subjects understand that a system with perfectly enforced taxes makes them better off.
Detailed results for T5 are presented in Figure 6 , where in four panels we replicate the results given in Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 5, respectively. Overall the results look similar to what we found in the other treatments, especially T1 and T3. Only in one run does the stock of the public good decline markedly from period 11 to 16. This is the run 3 where subjects voted 6:4 for implementing voluntary anonymous contributions. The effect is visible in several panels of 
Concluding Remarks
Public goods decisions are made in rich institutional settings. British history of the "tragedy of the commons" does not offer much insight into how to pay for the building and long run maintenance of public facilities. States evolved over centuries by enforcing weights and page 18
measures, commercial codes, accounting rules, law and order, and tax collection. In this study we take the structure of government to be able to provide these functions as a given.
We report on a novel laboratory experiment to explore the suitability of setting taxes through democratic voting to pay for public goods in a general equilibrium economy. The results of the experiment suggest that the important social problem of financing public goods can be addressed, fairly and efficiency, by societies through taxes set by democratic vote. Dependence on voluntary contributions among large groups may be too unreliable a basis for providing services essential to their productivity, even survival. Voluntary contribution mechanisms have the inherent appeal of being decentralized, and thus insulated from tyranny. Taxation, representing centralized power and a centralized enforcement mechanism, has historical associations with tyrannical oppression. Democratic government and taxation based on popular voting attempts to balance the consequences of centralization by fairness. Our experimental results suggest that such a reasonable balance is achievable for financing of public goods and services through democratic mechanisms. We find that the majority of subjects voted 23 times out of 24 (182 out of 240 votes individually) to favor a system with taxes over anonymous voluntary contributions. Treatment 5: 4 sessions*** *Voluntary contributions specified in units of money in one session and in percent of wealth in the other. **Two of these four sessions permitted 0 inputs to private good production; all other sessions of the experiment required a minimum of 1 unit of input. *** subjects decide by majority vote whether they implement a system with voluntary anonymous contributions or with taxes. 
APPENDIX A -Explanation of Two Microsoft Excel Workbooks Available Online
As supporting material for this paper we provide two MS EXCEL workbooks, one for infinite horizon economy, and the other for a finite horizon of 30 periods. In both workbooks all relevant input variables can be varied in cells E2 to E17. The notation is given in cells A2 to A17. Especially noteworthy in the infinite horizon setting are the tax rate (E7) and the consumption rate (E12), as these are the two variables for which the workbook optimizes using the solver function.
In rows 19 to 24 (22 to 28 in the finite setting) the sell-all market is modeled, with period 1 in column E, and subsequent periods to the right, up to period 20 in the infinite setting and period 30 in the finite setting. Right below, are the productions of private and public goods, again from period 1 (column E) to period 20 (30 in the finite setting).
Several charts from Columns H to AD illustrate the results and their sensitivity to variations in the input variables. Figures 7 and 8 give partial screenshots of the respective EXCEL workbooks (continued in rows below and columns to the right which are not captured in the screenshots). Here the tax rate (E7) and consumption rate (E12) are no longer fixed for several periods, but instead change from period to period. The respective values are displayed in rows 19 and 20.
APPENDIX B: Instructions
Dear participant: Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to any other subject for the duration of the experiment.
You are one of ten subjects populating a small economy with money and two kinds of goods: one private and one public good. As subjects, you will produce, sell, buy, and consume the private good. The government (played by the experimenter) will tax the income of subjects (from sale of the private good) and use the proceeds to buy some of the private good, to be used to produce the public good. The tax rate will be either fixed, or determined by the vote of the ten subjects once every five periods. Your earnings for each period depend on the quantity of private good you consume, and the quantity of the public good provided by the government for benefit of all in that period.
Money and Goods
There is money and two kinds of goods in the economy:
• A private good produced, sold, bought and consumed by the participating subjects; some the private good is also bought by the government and used to produce the public good.
• The public good (e.g., a public facility) which depreciates at the rate of 10 percent per round. The government uses tax collected from subjects to replenish the depreciating stock of public good.
In round 1 each subject starts with 4,700 units of money and 217 units of the private good. The government starts with 13,000 units of money and 427 (213.5 in half of the runs) units of the public good.
At the beginning of each round, all private good produced in (and carried over from) the preceding round) is sold in a market. Thus, the initial private good endowment of 217 units in the hands of each subject (for a total of 2,170) is sold at the start of round 1.
Money serves only a means of exchange in this economy, but it has no role in savings, etc. An amount of money is given to you at the beginning of the session, and any balance left over at the end of the session has no value to you. Each round all money you have (either initial endowment or earned from sale of goods the round before) is spent for the purchase of goods at the start of each round. No borrowing is possible.
At the start of a period all money held by the government and individuals is tendered to buy units of the private good. In the first period 2,170 units are sold for a total of 60,000 units of money.
Total agent and government bids in money = 60,000/2,170 (total number of units of private good) = 27.65. These numbers will change in subsequent rounds.
Each individual buys 170 units and earns 217*27.65=6,000 units of money. Your first decision is how many of these 170 units you invest into production for the next period, with the remainder being consumed this period. Your money income (6,000 in the first period) is taxed by the government at a rate set by all subjects through a vote (see details below).
On the left side of the Screen 2 you learn the total money bid for private good, the resulting price, the units bought by the government, and government's tax revenue (all of which is spent to buy private goods in the following round). On the right side of Screen 2 you see how many units you bought, your spending, income, tax, and the initial and final money balances (the latter to be carried over to the following round).
Screen 2 Out of the units of private good you bought, you have to decide on how many you wish to consume, and how many you wish to invest to produce private goods to be sold during the next round. The following equation and chart show the relationship between the units you invest and the units produced:
UNITS OF THE PRIVATE GOOD PRODUCED = 80*(UNITS INVESTED) 0.25 .
Note, for example, that investing 1 unit produces 80 units; investing 40 units produces 201.19 units.
Public Good
The government starts with a stock of 427 units of the public good. This stock depreciates by 10% each round, like, for example, roads deteriorate. To maintain or upgrade the public good the government taxes the subjects' income (from sales of goods) at the selected rate. All tax receipts are used to buy the private good and all private goods are used to produce new units of the public good according to the following function:
UNITS OF THE PUBLIC GOOD PRODUCED = 2*(UNITS OF PRIVATE GOOD INVESTED) 0.5 . 
Taxes
All individual income (proceeds from sale of private good) will be taxed at a flat tax rate (which is either fixed by the experimenter in advance, or is set by the vote of ten subjects). In the latter case, every five rounds (i.e., at the beginnings of rounds 1, 6, 11, 16, etc.) each subject is asked to submit his/her suggested percent rate of taxation to be applicable to all ten subjects. You are free to suggest any integer number between zero (no tax) and 100 (everything taken by the government) as the percent tax rate. The computer collects the suggested tax rates from the ten subjects, sorts them from highest to lowest, and sets the median (average of the 5 th and the 6 th suggested rates) as the tax rate for all subjects. The selected tax rate is announced, and it remains in effect for five rounds until the next tax rate is determined though another vote. (In half of the treatments the tax rate was fixed at 21.5. percent and no vote was carried out)
Points earned
The points you earn in each round are calculated as: Table  1 show the number of points resulting from various combinations of private good consumption and public good provision by government.
(Insert Chart 1)
History screen:
After all subjects enter their consumption/investment decisions, computer carries out all the calculations, and a history screen provides a round-by-round overview of the results (the accounting of public goods on the left, your consumption and production of goods in the middle, the points you earn during the round on the right, and the summary of the round at the bottom).
History Screen
